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Abstract 
 
Using structuration theory, this paper examines capital budgeting and its role in the ‘energy 
trilemma’. The key focus is on the role of knowledgeable agency inffq s.  the analysis of strategic 
conduct. In particular, demonstrating how accounting tools can be used by executive managers, who 
whilst dominant in their own organisations, are themselves subordinate to the government in the 
United Kingdom and at the European level. The strategic conduct of actors is examined in a narrative, 
theorised case study setting, which spans across 11 years, 2006- 2017. The principal contribution to 
knowledge from this study is the extent to which strategic investment accounting played in changing 
regulatory and government policy and spending requirements in a privatised industry. The most 
dominant party, the government and regulators, were forced to take the generators’ concerns 
seriously, because the generators (based on knowledge derived from capital budgets) restricted their 
capital expenditure rather than mobilising their resources. The need for resources to reduce emissions 
provided an opportunity for the industry to force the government to consider the problem of energy. 
The generators highlighted that this was not only a problem of price for consumers and environmental 
sustainability, but as one of long term supply. The generators argued that government had to address 
all aspects of the trilemma when creating policy. 
  
Keywords: Capital budgeting, investment appraisal, uncertainty, environmental regulation, Large 
Combustion Plant Directive, knowledgeable agency, strategic conduct. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Encouraging the right type of investment is essential to the success of any energy policy. Suitable 
investments would maintain low prices, achieve reductions in emissions, and keep the lights on 
(Warren, 2014). The World Energy Council has identified supply, pricing, and emissions as the three 
major global energy concerns, termed within the industry as ‘the energy trilemma’. However, 
establishing a suitable energy policy is subject to complex regulatory systems, which both impose 
controls on prices to consumers and set out environmental targets for companies. This can be specific 
to a particular country.  Change of any form, in the energy industry, requires complicated discussions 
and debates with regulators, politicians and generators. Although the relative dominance of each 
group of actors varies across the world, each country faces a similar problem: how to balance the 
energy trilemma.  
  
The energy trilemma is recognised as an urgent problem in Great Britain (GB)
1
,  the geographical 
setting for this case study. It is urgent because energy prices for consumers rose during the main data 
collection period for the case study, 2006-2014, (DECC2, 2014a), while security of supply is proving 
to be an as yet unresolved issue (OFGEM3, 2012, Johnson, 2014, Grigorjeva, 2015, Yiakoumi & 
Rouaix, 2016, DBEIS4, 2017). In 2011, the industry regulators acknowledged that the country’s 
market energy structure was no longer fit for purpose (DECC, 2011), highlighting the distinct lack 
of new significant investment. According to DECC (2014b), the requirement for reduced emissions 
is the only component of the energy trilemma currently being achieved. This has led to public 
outrage, and questions over why such a crucial commodity as electricity is apparently being 
irresponsibly managed (Inman, 2014; Morison, 2014). Appreciation of the significance of lack of 
investment is central to understanding the energy trilemma. As Falkner (2014:188) argues, “energy 
is central to the survival and prosperity of human society”.   
 
                                                          
1 The paper will refer to GB when discussing investment problems because Ireland has a separate energy system, 
which is regulated by its own body. 
2 DECC - is an department called ‘Department of Energy and Climate Change’.  
3 Ofgem  - Office for gas and electricity markets. 
4 Department that superseeds DECC.  DEBIS is ‘Department of Energy, Business and Industrial Strategy’. 
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During the period covered by the study, the industry argued that the laissez faire approach by the  
government, regarding investment in new power plants, discouraged capital investment. We examine 
how senior managers at the electricity generation companies used accounting in communications 
with regulators and governments when seeking change.  In particular, we investigate the extent to 
which senior managers used accounting techniques strategically  during the implementation of the 
revised Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD). Their conduct was calculated both to transform 
the structures within which they had to work, and to change the conduct of others.  
 
Responding to the call for studies which focus on the role of a knowledgeable agency in the analysis 
of  strategic conduct (Englund and Gerdin, 2011; Roberts, 2014; Coad et al., 2016). Here, we focus 
on the roles of knowledgeable agents using contradictory structures to generate conflict. We observed 
agents using their knowledge of those structures and of the actions of others in a deliberate way. 
Agency concerns how they actively influence, motivate, start an argument or discussion, and whether 
outcomes are intended or unintended. As Stones has argued, conduct analysis examines how we feel 
when things are against us, in relation to established norms (Stones and Jack, 2016). The changes in 
this case study are not made to accounting systems but to the accountability of investment decisions, 
thereby using strategic conduct to assess strategic behaviour. Therefore, we will be both drawing on 
the work of Giddens’ original Structuration Theory (ST) and building on Stones’ (2005) development 
of the knowledgeability of agency. This enables us to contribute to the development of structuration 
theory in accounting research by by analysing how people use accounting to control and change 
others (Coad et al., 2016). Therefore, our main themes are; 
1) How did the agents think about the context? 
2) How did the agents plan their conduct? 
3) What actions were taken using capital budgeting? 
4) What were the outcomes of  actions based on knowledge? 
The theoretical contribution emerging from the analysis and interpretation of the case study 
strengthens our understanding of how change can be accounted for using strategic conduct analysis. 
A chief criticism of Giddens’ ST is that it is often used to demonstrate how institutions become 
established and maintained, but not how structures and actions adjust over time. This is attributable 
to the underdeveloped epistemology of the original theory, and its concept of strategic conduct 
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analysis. How particular agents draw strategically on their knowledge of structure and the conduct 
of others, when they attempt to alter the knowledgeability and perspectives of other agents, shows 
how structures might become altered.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 examines the capital budgeting 
literature; section 3 introduces the methods employed within this case study research; section 4 
provides an overview of the theory; section 5 details the background to the environmental regulations 
imposed in the UK; section 6 presents the case study; section 7 is the discussion, and section 8 
provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature 
Investing in capital projects such as power stations is a complex process. Management accounting 
offers many numerical techniques that aids the capital budgeting for decision-making in such 
projects.  CIMA (2009) found that 60% of organisations use Net Present Value (NPV), 55% used the 
payback method, 43% used Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and 18% used the Accounting Rate of 
Return (ARR) for the capital budgeting analysis. These are often referred to as the traditional methods 
whilst other more sophisticated methods, such as Real Options, sit outside that group.  Only two are 
based on the use of discounted cash flows: NPV and Real Options. NPV is the most prevalent method 
encountered in our study. 
Alkaraan and Northcott (2006) state that Strategic Investment Decisions (SIDs) can be distinguished 
from operational investments by considering level of risk, intangible outcomes, the size of 
investment, and long-term impact on company performance. The majority of SIDs will use capital 
budgeting as a decision making tool; with the basic definition of capital budgeting being, “a process 
concerned with decision making in respect of specific investment project choices and the total 
amount of capital expenditure to commit” (CIMA, 2008:7). However, when dealing with high levels 
of risk taking, the process can be  much more complex than the definition suggests.  Pfeiffer and 
Schneider (2010:1) extend the basic definition of capital budgeting and propose a process of capital 
budgeting that “defines a set of rules to govern the way in which managers at different levels of the 
hierarchy produce and share information about investment projects”. We find that this could be 
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extended to encompass the entire communication process within the organisational field, including 
with regulators. The investment decision making process also includes the assessment of human 
behaviour and individuals’ resources, as well as those of the organisation itself and the institution 
surrounding it.  
Emmanuel et al. (2010) argue that every capital investment decision involves uncertainty, 
particularly those that are innovative in nature; here, we argue that the presence of new regulations 
can be equally problematic when engaging in strategic decisions. Of course, literature has 
demonstrated that capital budgeting techniques are not just used as decision making tools; just as this 
paper will demonstrate that information from capital budgeting can be used to produce change in the 
structure, knowledgeability and processes of the market. Others have shown it can be used as a tool 
for mediating (Miller and O’Leary, 2007) and legitimising (Moll and Hoque, 2011). Jones and 
Dugdale (1994) find that field and practitioner narratives have been explaining the wider use of 
investment decisions for some time. They noted that scholars before them called for more work on 
the strategic nature (Scapens et al, 1982, as cited in Jones and Dugdale, 1994) of using capital 
investment techniques and consideration of processes as a whole (King, 1975, as cited in Jones and 
Dugdale, 1994).  
Looking first at the general literature on investment decision-making, work on the energy sector is 
sparse in business journals but is found in, policy and utilities journals. For example, Peng & 
Poudineh (2017) examine investment vehicles in the developing sector in Tanzania, used to fund 
increased plant capacity in a state owned utility company through independent power plants, energy 
power producers, small power producers and the growing public-private partnerships with mainly 
Chinese companies.  Although this paper does not examine the decision making process itself, it does 
highlight the growing dependency on government / international partnership investments. This is 
very similar to the current proposals for a new nuclear plant (EDF, 2018) in the United Kingdom 
(UK). The majority of papers in this area examine investment patterns using econometric modelling. 
Cullman and Nieswand (2016), looking at the sector in Germany conclude that generators increase 
their investment in the base year of incentive regulation, but do not examine how these decisions 
were brought about.  
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Pineau, Rasata & Zaccour (2011) use stochastic modelling for prediction purposes. They found that 
within a Finnish, oligopolistic market,  it was difficult to predict choice of technology because the 
model had incomplete information on how the players determined their choices. These studies point 
to the lack of papers investigating how investment decisions are made.They also highlight that 
investment problems in the energy industry are common across countries. 
Within business journals there are a few papers that consider investment in the electricity sector. 
Warren, Quinn and Kristandl (2018) examine the influence of financialisation on investment 
decisions in GB from 1960  to 2010.  They use a similar methodology to ours finding that the common 
logics that underpin investment practices in GB have changed over the period examined.  They 
emphasise that one needs to understand political-economics and institutional change in the UK to 
fully appreciate how and why investments are made in this industry. They also found that the use of 
accounting in investment has been, to some extent, a contributory factor to the power supply 
problems now faced by the British public. However, they do not address the the problems that have 
occurred following 2010 and nor did they examine the decision making process itself. 
 
Despite the extensive nature of the literature in the area of investment appraisal (for example see 
Pike and Wolfe, 1987; Northcott, 1991; Sangster, 1993; Sandahl and Sjogren, 2003; Ekanem, 2005 
& 2007; Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Kerler, Fleming & Allport, 2013; Elmassri, Harris & Carter 
2016 and Harris, Northcott, Elmassri & Huikku, 2016) capital budgeting has received limited 
attention (Miller and O’Leary, 2007). This is surprising, since Bower (cited in Miller and O’Leary, 
2007) identified a distinct need to address the process of capital budgeting in 1972 and Jones and 
Dugdale (1994) questioned the academic focus on application and technique rather than the gap 
between theory and practice.  It is more surprising when you consider that capital investment 
decisions are critical to organisations’ future performances (Emmanuel, Harris & Komakeck, 2010), 
because significant investment is often irreversible due to the enormous sunk costs involved 
(Chittenden and Derregia, 2014). 
  
As capital budgeting evolved from financial economics (Haka, 2007), the majority of studies in this 
area employ methods embedded within a mainstream (positivist) methodology (for example see Pike 
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and Wolfe, 1987; Sangster, 1993 and Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006). Hence, the literature assumes 
that market players pursue their own self-interest, to ensure the best possible outcomes from all their 
decisions. For example, the use of NPV implies that if an outcome is positive or holds the highest 
NPV, then acceptance of it will provide the best possible results for those who benefit from the 
cashflow surplus to the cost of capital. In addition, traditional economic theory also presumes that 
cash-flow decisions are typically made to maximise owners’ wealth, and to provide a basis on which 
to estimate future costs (Ekanem, 2005).  
 
Regulation within the UK energy market is broadly based on the same neoclassical economic theory 
(Bohne, 2011) as capital budgeting, with the basic foundation being: 1) people have rational 
preferences from among the possible outcomes; 2) individuals maximise utility, and firms maximise 
profits; and 3) people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information. Moreover, 
within neoclassical economic theory, the effective implementation of regulations as a foundation for 
market structure are assumed; this provides a role for politics and public bodies, not only economists 
(Bohne, 2011). However, because market structure has failed to meet the expectations expressed by 
the generation industry, it is necessary to question how this affects the capital budgeting processes, 
because as Bui and Villers (2017) have found, decisions relating to climate change policies often 
produce conservative strategies. 
The increasing use of regulation to impose political policy and balance macro economic concerns 
raises questions over the role of regulations in decision making; especially when they generate greater 
uncertainty. Even with the added use of abandonment and real options theory, accurate prediction in 
an environment of regulatory uncertainty is unrealistic. As Haka (2007) argues, uncertainty is one of 
the most difficult factors to address when making an investment decision, especially when evaluating 
a long-term investment. Uncertainty relates to the variables affecting long-term pricing, market 
stability, and unpredictable future public policies.  
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According to Elmassri et al. (2016) and Harris et al. (2016), the majority of previous work in the area 
of SIDs has ignored the role of agency and the context of evolving and changing external5 structures. 
In support of this view, Elmassri et al. (2016) explain that the very nature of SIDs results in changing 
structures and understanding about how agents respond to this in their judgments is another missing 
element of literature in this area. However, as Jones and Dugdale explained in 1994,  context was a 
significant factor in how capital budgeting would be used in practice. We examine investment 
appraisal in a context that incorporates all the factors arising from environmental regulation, the 
unknowability of future price curves, and, more significantly, a potential for future revisions to 
regulations and energy policies. Uncertainties are known to result in companies postponing 
investments, as has occurred within the GB generation industry (Chittenden and Derregia, 2013). 
  
3. Theoretical framework 
Giddens’ work on ST provides a “comprehensive theoretical system which theorists love to interpret 
and contest” (Bryant & Jary, 2011:12); however, it also offers an ontological orientation to social life 
that “has done better than any other (meta) theory available” (Bryant & Jary, 2011:12). Nevertheless, 
“structuration theory would be still more effective if it were made easier for researchers to move 
from ontology in general to substantive inquires… what is missing from Giddens’ theory of 
structuration is concern for the strategic context of action.” (Bryant & Jary, 2011:12).  
Giddens’ ST relies on methodological bracketing for analysis of evidence. Either one concentrates 
on structure through institutional analysis, or on agency through strategic conduct of analysis. With 
this in mind Englund et al. (2011) identified three core ways in which accounting could be 
conceptualised; 1) accounting as a structure, 2) accounting as an artefact, and 3) accounting as an 
interplay between structures and artifacts. While ST has been the foundation of some interesting 
research in the field of accounting (see for example Ahrens and Chapman, 2002; Seal, 2003; Seal et 
al., 2004; Conrad, 2005; Jack, 2006; Gurd, 2008; Moore, 2010; Conrad 2013;  and Englund et al., 
                                                          
5 These studies used Strong Structuration Theory (SST), hence the use of the term ‘external structures’. 
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2013), studies to date have lacked thorough examination of strategic conduct (Englund and Gerdin, 
2014; Roberts, 2014). 
 
The lack of strategic conduct studies is partially explained by the fact that Giddens’ (1984) own 
development of structuration placed more weight on ontology than epistemology, resulting in 
strategic conduct analysis being less developed and understood. However, Strong Structuration 
Theory (SST) (Stones, 2005), which synthesises critiques of Giddens’ original theory, does attempt 
to develop the epistemology and advance empirical study using the theory, as it “can translate the 
ontology of ST into the epistemology and methodological understanding required by researchers on 
the ground” (Jack & Kholeif, 2008: 30). The dynamic use of SST provides an opportunity to analyse 
“the issue of agency in situ rather than on structure cut off from agency” (Coad et al., 2016). 
Accounting studies applying ST tend to overuse the methodological bracketing that focuses on 
institutional rather than strategic conduct analysis (Englund and Gerdin, 2014). 
 
We examine the strategic conduct of the actors/agents within GB’s electricity generation industry to 
understand how these actors use their knowledge of the contextual field to strategically respond to 
change while lobbying for further change. Conduct analysis is when a researcher needs to examine 
the agent by looking inwards, a very different form of methodological bracketing to “when the 
researcher is looking at the actor hermeneutically” (Stones & Jack, 2016: 1148). The understanding 
that “what is going on in the heads of people is never free-floating… it is always embedded in 
contextual fields” (Stones & Jack, 2016: 1149) remains consistent in both ST and SST. Context 
analysis looks outward, to what the agents-in-focus perceive as external structure and their 
understanding of the internal structures and conduct of networked others. While there have been 
discussions about whether to use the flat ontology of ST (Englund and Gerdin, 2016) or that 
developed by Stones’ SST (Coad et al., 2016), there is agreement that both approaches represent “a 
powerful tool in analysing management accounting and changes” (Englund and Gerdin, 2016).  
 
 
Giddens’ (1979, 1984) theory of structuration is based upon several assumptions; two of which are 
that all social actors are knowledgeable, and that actors have a conscious understanding of their 
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actions. The level of knowledge that an actor has is determined by two factors: the unconscious and 
unacknowledged conditions of the unintended consequences of action. ST also assumes that social 
behaviour includes day-to-day actions, which become routine (i.e. habits), and that social actors are 
partly constrained by the structural properties of systems. However, it is important to highlight that 
although structures provide constraints, this does not always result in actors accepting them. 
Ultimately, Giddens (1979, 1984) argues that actors are responsible for their own behaviour; as 
society does not represent a sufficient excuse to justify their actions. Agents have the ability to plan 
their conduct, they do not have to simply accept the constraints that surround the decision they are 
taking. 
 
Strategic conduct analysis is defined by Giddens (1984: 378) as “concentrating upon how actors 
reflexively monitor what they do; how they draw upon rules and resources in the constitution of 
interaction”, which focuses on contextually situated actions. This type of analysis requires detailed 
accounts of agents’ knowledgeability, motivation, and the dialectic of control. Thus, 
knowledgeability and motivation are central to Giddens’ ontology and strategic conduct. As Stones 
(1996: 43) observes, “The more knowledgeable agents are about their conditions of action...then, all 
things being equal, the less likely they are to engage in practices that then lead to unintended 
consequences”. Part of that knowledgeability involves understanding the extent to which domination 
within systems can be countered (Stones, 2005), and actors’ positions regarding the ability to enact 
a dialectic of control. This study observes agents, who in one context can dominate the decision 
making process by virtue of their managerial position, but who are subordinate in other contexts 
(national or European regulatory contexts). Thus, they experience the dialectic of control from both 
sides.  
Although Giddens’ (1979) work on the dialectic of control is subject to interpretation, this research 
largely agrees with Nandan (1998); allowing that the term dialectic can be used to refer to shifts in 
the balance of power over time and space, with the associated changes relating to changing 
circumstances. However, Nandan (1998) explains that those changing circumstances represent the 
outcome of knowledgeable, subordinate agents using the (meagre) resources they own. Frames of 
reference are provided by anagents’ knowledge of rules and routines, and the resources available to 
them; as well as of the regulatory environment and its norms and sanctions; and patterns of decision-
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making involved in capital budgeting.. They can then draw on these strategically to determine when 
to exert power, and when to resist (Saravanamuthu and Tinker, 2003).  
Stones’(2005) SST developed Giddens’ (1984) concept of dialectic of control into a framework of 
resistance, using the agent’s context and conduct analyses to reveal where, when and why agents 
choose to avoid control. The approach proposed by Stones (2005) involves carrying out an analysis 
from the position-practices of one or more agents-in-focus. Stones and Jack (2016) argue that the 
difference between ST and SST in the area of strategic conduct analysis is that the design of the 
project must “include conduct analysis of other actors and a deeper hermeneutic analysis of the actors 
within the structural context” (p1150), thus bringing the actors in situ (Coad et al., 2016). While the 
authors agree that full use of SST can be very insightful, the research design of the original case study 
was based on ST; therefore, this paper will retain the concepts strategic conduct and the dialectic of 
control by evidencing the careful selection of communications. We consider the concept of ‘conduct’ 
as a process that is active, processual and ongoing, not only comprised of individual acts or individual 
documents, but involving motives, influences, arguments, stance taken, and even conspiracies. 
This case study examines the strategic conduct involved in negotiating the energy trilemma. The 
capital budgeting process provides an interesting context within which to examine the complexity of 
the strategic conduct of agents. Our case study presents agents’ context analyses of a complex market 
structure, which enabled generators to analyse in turn the strategic conduct that would force the 
government to listen to their demands for new market structures and policies. The generators were 
able to manipulate industry circumstances to achieve reform; as Giddens (1984: 257) argued, the 
process of power is the “capacity to achieve outcomes”. The generators mobilised their power to 
fight against the government, who in turn sought to distance itself from investment in a privatised 
industry, thus triggering a power shift.  
This case study contributes to the debate by illustrating how generators shifted the balance of power 
by both identifying contradictions within the industry, and exploiting changes in the UK economy. 
This power shift instigated the Electricity Market Reform (EMR), which brought about significant 
changes to the UK market structure.  
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4. Research Method 
To examine the role of capital budgeting against the backdrop of environmental regulations imposing 
uncertainties on decision makers, we present a longitudinal, narrative theorised case study spanning 
the period 2006 to 2016.  The research instruments used to collect data for the case study were 
designed to include the collection of both primary and secondary data. Primary data comprises mainly 
semi-structured interviews6 and public focus groups with regulators, politicians, analysts, engineers, 
accountants, strategic advisors, environmental managers and five of the big six energy generators. 
Initially all six of the energy generators were contacted and interviews arranged, however, due to 
practical timing issues only five of the big six resulted in interviews taking place. The individuals 
interviewed came about through  various channels; some were identified as knowledgeable in the 
area being examined at industry conferences, others through personal contacts within the industry 
and others through interviewees being asked if they could recommend others in specific jobs. The 
semi structured interviews used 15 main interviewees, and some of these were interviewed several 
times. The average time of each interview was 1 hour and 5 minutes. As can be seen in table 1, most 
of the interviewees had significant industrial experience. 
Table 1 - Interviewees length of time in the industry 
Role Years of service 
(as of 2016) 
Head of Operations 33 
Head of Thermal Power 33 
Environmental Permitting Regulator 23 
Head of Coal Operations 40 
Commercial Manager 18 
Environmental Planning Manager 447  
Business Service Director 27 
General Manager Operations 25 
Head of Environment 40 
Head of Gas Generation 29 
Site Manager 36 
                                                          
6 Questions provided in the appendix 
7 Retired in 2014 so was not contacted after this, length of service based on 2014. 
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Environmental Manager 29 
Trader 17 
Head of Corporate Regulation 22 
Head of Thermal Power, UK 32 
 
The interviews and secondary data collection occurred across a 10-year period, but was largely 
concentrated between 2008 and 2010; however, there was contact with most interviewees after this 
period to confirm information from their interviewees or to request more clarity on specific issues. 
In addition there were two new full interviews in 2016 that confirmed market changes and the 
outcomes established in relation to the case study. The interviews were all recorded, with the 
exception of one preliminary phone interview and two follow up interviews. Upon completion of the 
interviews, they were transcribed and a process of thematic analysis used. Following the transcription 
of each interview the interviewer analysed the transcript to identify emerging themes; these helped 
to inform future interviews without influencing the ability of the interviewees to express an opinion.  
Secondary data included additional data obtained from document analysis (e.g. White Papers, 
company reports, industry discussion papers, UK government minutes from public discussions, and 
European directive reports). Finally, industry conferences were attended annually throughout the data 
collection period, allowing the researchers to follow the changes put forward in policy statements. 
 
 
5. Background 
The UK electricity industry is currently privatised, and before privatisation in 1990, the majority of 
investment in the UK energy market centred on the use of coal and oil (Warren et al., 2018). However, 
since privatisation, the 1990s have witnessed a rush of new investments, relying on low priced gas 
as the main fuel (Warren, 2014). After 2001, following the introduction of a new market structure,8 
                                                          
8 New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) - a system that used future contracts mainly. The system was introduced 
to remove the price manipulation associated with the previous system called The Pool System. 
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six dominant competitors emerged; they are vertically integrated to the limits that the regulations9 
allow.  The main generators hold oligopoly power and the network is a natural monopoly. Since 
2001, electricity has been sold in the same way as any other commodity, traded through mechanisms 
such as spot pricing and future contacts. However, unlike other commodities the risks involved in 
these future contracts are high, because there is no way of storing electricity.10 Consequently, the 
costs associated with breakdowns are high, and over time, investments in the industry reduced 
significantly. The reduction in investments can be attributed to rising gas prices and growing 
uncertainties surrounding the increasing environmental regulations being introduced by the European 
Union (EU) (Warren, 2014; Warren et al., 2018). There is little doubt that the new market structure, 
in 2001, increased the complexity of the investment decisions within this industry. Uncertainties and 
risks created instability when the government adopted a laissez faire approach.  However, this 
changed following intense lobbying from the generators alongside investment hiatus, which resulted 
in the introduction of the EMR (2013) in GB.  
The problems discussed in this case study are specific to GB; however, similar problems are facing 
other liberalised energy markets. Grigorjeva (2015:1) argues that “The incompatibility of the still 
persisting functioning principles of the electricity markets with the changed market reality have 
resulted in serious market failures which negatively affect investment climate and therefore pose a 
risk towards the security of supply in the EU.” This case study  focuses on thermal power within GB, 
as these were the plants that were impacted by the LCPD.It is important to note that there were many 
other narratives occurring alongside the debate we focus on, including the nuclear debate and the 
carbon tax debate. 
 
From 2000 onwards, environmental regulation has been a key political issue in the UK (Warren et 
al., 2018). One of the most significant regulations to affect investment strategies within GB was the 
LCPD. The LCPD is a European directive aimed at reducing nitrogen oxide (NOx), sulphur dioxide 
(SO2) and dust emissions, to combat environmental problems such as acid rain. The directive is 
                                                          
9 These competitors cannot operate within the management of energy infrastructure, which in England and Wales is 
owned and operated by National Grid 
10 Storage of electricity is one of the biggest research projects in this industry 
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intended to protect the public from air pollutants considered to represent health risks (European 
Commission, 2001).11 Some parties view setting environmental targets as a way of winning votes. 
Consequently, successive governments have focused on policies highlighting a green agenda, leaving 
general investment up to the industry. Since 2000, the energy industry has demanded policies that 
provide certainty on issues, such as which technologies will receive government support in the future, 
so that they can make investment decisions. However, the government objective was market led 
investment. The government wanted to open the markets to encourage broader competition, in the 
hope that this would drive prices down and encourage investment; however, these are contradictory 
objectives when investments are long term. 
Although the LCPD was signed well in advance of the commencement of this case study, this 
directive added to the contradictory objectives set out by the Government. The LCPD resulted in new 
targets for decreasing emissions, which would ultimately impact both prices and new investment. 
Nevertheless, at the start of the case study and during the data collection phase, how these regulations 
could be met was still a topic of discussion. Investments were still being analysed in terms of 
investment appraisal techniques, and decisions concerning the LCPD remained unresolved during 
the first three years of the study. 
As a result of the LCPD, all installations (coal and oil stations) had to either opt in or opt out of the 
directive. ‘Opting in’ meant the installation would need to invest in costly Fuel Gas Desulphurisation 
(FGD) equipment to reduce pollution, on average costing £200 million. ‘Opting out’ would result in 
the installation only being able to operate for 20,000 hours from 2008-2015 until closure. The 
considerations made by generators in relation to their investment decisions were not based solely on 
whether to invest in FDG equipment. Alternative investments were considered, such as 
commissioning new power stations and closing old ones. 
The LCPD had a significant impact on UK energy portfolio. 11,842MWs out of 33,839MW12 of 
supply was closed down when generators chose not to make new investments (Dukes, 2010). The 
reduction in MWs entering the system created a strain of the supply of electricity; one of the 
                                                          
11 Although some of these references may seem outdated these were relevant for the decisions made within this research. 
12 33,839MW was the amount of supply affected by the LCPD, these decision were taken in 2008. To put this into 
perspective, in the following year 2009-2010 maximum demand in the UK was 60, 231 MW (Dukes, 2010) 
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consequences identified in the trilemma. The LCPD highlighted a number of problems within the 
energy market, the biggest of which was that government policies neither identified, nor supported, 
the frameworks required to reduce uncertainties; hence, there was a halt to investments within the 
UK (Warren et al., 2018). The EU directive had encouraged the UK government to focus on 
emissions, resulting in too little attention being directed towards supply and pricing.  
 
6. Case study 
This case study is set out as follows: 1) how agents thought about the context surrounding the 
investment decision, 2) how the agents planned their conduct, 3) the actions that were taken using 
capital budgeting and 4) other actions based on knowledge outcomes. We aimed to understand how 
the agents-in-focus thought about the context of the investment, their knowledge of the structures 
and how others would act during the process. The analysis showshow the agents felt when policy 
changed and they perceived the new rules to be working against them. Also,  how they planned their 
conduct to influence, motivate and create discussions to counter to dominant groups.  The last step 
is to follow the outcomes of the conduct aimed at shifting the balance of power within the industry 
away from the regulators and towards the generators. 
 
6.1 Capital budgeting:  how agents thought about their context 
 
When the LCPD was implemented, all the generators who owned power stations using coal and oil 
had to respond to the Environment Agency (EA) stating whether or not they intended to invest in the 
requisite technology to reduce emissions. This process required each generator to submit an 
application to the EA under the Pollution Prevention Control13 (PPC). However, before those 
submission could start it required a process of reflection of the current context of decision and where 
the company wanted to be  strategically. 
                                                          
13 Now called the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) 
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Capital budgeting played a significant role in the reflection. When making investment decisions, one 
of the roles of capital budgeting is as a vehicle for communication, drawing on codes from the theory 
of investment. Accounting drove the discussions on how the new regulations would impact the future 
of the company, how their competitors would react and how their decision could influence or disrupt 
the industry going forward:  
We had to sit and think about what we wanted to do…...it was like having a crystal ball and 
somehow we had to give the best advice …..it was a big grey area that made us think because 
there was so much forecasting required and uncertainty involved. (Business Service Director) 
The language of investment appraisal (accounting) became the dominant language, in the reflection 
process because it provided a platform where everything could get translated into something 
everyone understood. Regulators accepted this approach because they understood that finances 
would come first for generators. One of the regulatory team (Environment Agency14) stated: 
We are interested in quality and quantity of the investments but of course at the end of the 
day this has to translate into numbers because the numbers have to be justified, they are 
not going to do it if the economics are against it. 
The values and data for capital budgeting decisions, in this case,  were unknown. As a Business 
Service Director explained: 
The details of the directive were very unclear for a long time; some of the fundamentals 
were missing, like if you opt out and you get 20,000 hours what does that mean? Do the 
20,000 hours refer to a ‘unit’ or per ‘site’ - in the end it turned out to be per ‘stack’. If 
you have four flues inside one chimney what is that? How can you model the economics 
of opting in and opting out if you don’t know the detail?  
Here, they drew on their knowledge of engineering, legislation and finances to make sense of the 
new rules.  As one Head of Environment explained, 
                                                          
14 In this case study there are two sets of regulators, the Environment Agency (EA) who were part of stage 1. Then in 
stage 2 the Department of Energy, Climate and Control (DECC) - the name of this department has since changed. 
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So we’re in a position of major transition, the industry was changing…….we have 
never done anything quite like this before…...we had to sit and think about these 
changes but also others and the future…..what did it all mean for us. 
This was a critical reflective point, because the generators that wanted to opt out and hold back 
investment needed to ensure they could secure as much profit as possible during the final stage of a 
power station’s life before they were forced to close it down. It was clear that the generators felt that 
things were working against them and that they had to think about how to overcome those problems. 
The complexity of the situation was revealed in the initial debates, because although the majority of 
the generators were involved in the Joint Energy Project (JEP),15 and were arguing for clarity on 
various points, they were simultaneously preparing for separate lobbying processes (to be discussed 
in the next section). However, before they could do that they needed to fully understand the changes 
in the market and industry at large . The individual power stations represented by the JEP all had 
different needs, because the definitions within technical policies had a different financial impact for 
each site. No single power station is built or designed the same as another. For example, when 
debating the definitions of shutdown and startup  in terms of their treatment in the 20,00016 hours 
ahead, a Head of Environment said: 
The LCPD was a difficult beast… we were trying to define startup and shutdowns… it 
became very obvious that some companies wanted to go down one route and others down 
another, the divisions were obvious.  
As each Power Station was designed with different technology, the way in which these definitions 
were determined made a difference to what would count towards the 20,000 hours, resulting in 
dissimilar financial consequences. The knowledge that the generators exchanged with the 
Environment Agency (EA) to flush out the complications of a directive on paper needed to be 
translated into engineering terms and financial outcomes. Moreover, the way in which the emissions 
would be monitored was also subject to a significant debate. Exchanging knowledge was across all 
                                                          
15 The JEP mainly consisted of Environmental Managers and Engineers. 
16 If the generator chose to opt out of the LCPD they would seek derogation from the regulation that would 
allow them to operate for an 20,000hours without having to comply with the required investment to reduce 
emission. 
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parties, is essential to understanding the problems faced. For example, the generators were unhappy 
with the original directive suggesting how emissions should be monitored: should hours should be 
counted, per unit, per site or per stack? Following the debates one regulator understood that: 
You can see that the generators with the same power output they have basically the same 
technology and they are treated differently because of some technically ill-informed 
bureaucrats… we get directives and they make claims on what is possible but it is not 
until we talk to industry that they tell us it is not possible unless they are in perfect 
working conditions, so as this point we have to go back to the bureaucrats and say have 
you actually got evidence that this can be done? It is a circulating body of knowledge to 
which people jump into the pot. 
As the stock of knowledge for all the agents became clearer,  NPV modelling provided a platform to 
think about the wider picture. It was an extremely complicated process, which began with the 
environmental directive itself. With the engineers and regulators working together to consider the 
situation facing them, the aim was to avoid unintended consequences. One Head of Operations stated: 
The decision begins with asking yourself how you can survive in the market… what will 
the future electricity prices be like? What size do you want your company to be? What 
technology do you want to be known for? You look at the project… how much does it cost 
to buy land? For alternatives what would the price of a gas contract be? What would the 
rent connection be for the location you have chosen? What is the hurdle rate for that 
particular type of project? Because these do vary for different projects. 
Projecting pricing curves was an essential of the modelling process, completed either in house, or by 
outside consultants. But as one General Manager of Operations stated, 
The pricing curves are the most difficult, we have a whole range of tools that our trading 
guys use and they have statistical packages that do the number crunching but typically 
the most difficult thing is the price of carbon and knowing what your competitors do - 
what your competitors do will affect the price of electricity going forward. 
Such work needed a team with expertise from different areas of the firm:  
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We have a Commercial Team that are responsible for all big investments. If it is a capital 
project they will go direct to the engineering group. The Engineering Group will help with 
engineering compliance. The trading team will also be involved because they will feed in 
the pricing curves. Of course there are legal consults etc. (Head of Coal Operations) 
The information required to complete a model takes a long time to acquire. With policies changing 
and the details of directives being decided upon during the planning stage, modelling can take around 
5 years, as explained by one of the Environmental Managers: 
When the LCPD was on the horizon, it was like right guys we’ve got five or six years to 
sort this out… someone will start looking at the kit needed so the engineering people, the 
commercial development team will look at the options available to meet this criteria, 
checks and appraisals. I will look at the law and keep them updated as to what is happening. 
The financial stuff happens separately from what I do, all I do is make sure they have the 
right information from an environmental point of view. 
 
The NPV modelling  provided an opportunity for the generators to think about their own plans and the 
involvement in the JEP. They added to their knowledge by garnering an understanding how their 
competitors would be conducting themselves in this process.This was essential in planning their own 
conduct going forward. 
6.2 How agents planned their conduct 
 
The generators planned their conduct using capital budgeting model as a process to bring all the 
options the table. The process of how capital investment decisions were made, who was involved, 
and the strategic nature of the accounting process that took place as part of the modelling is shown 
in  Table 2. 
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Table 2 - Stages of the capital budgeting process for the LCPD
17
 
                                                          
17 Every generator will have their own process but from the interview data this is the average process - also 
note that the names of teams will vary from organisation to organisation 
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Process Stage Details and who was 
involved 
Documents used and those 
strategically ignored 
1.Clarity of the 
directive – using 
accounting 
information to 
inform engineering 
decisions. 
Stage 1 At this stage the technical 
issues within the directive 
had to be determined to 
translate the issues into 
financial values. 
Involved: external 
consultation with 
Environment Agency, 
Joint Environmental 
Project, and other 
generators. 
The key document was the 
LCPD directive itself. 
2. Development of 
the capital 
budgeting 
modelling and 
business plan. 
Stage 2 Consultations internally 
with Commercial Teams, 
Engineering Teams, 
Trading Teams and legal 
consults. 
Here the UK 
Implementation policy was 
used alongside engineering 
documentation, legal 
statements and economic 
predictions. The permit 
application and cost 
benefit requirement from 
the regulatory was ignored 
at this stage. 
3. Business Plan 
(containing the 
results of the 
capital budgeting) 
is sent to the 
assurance team/ 
treasury teams. 
Stage 3 Internal consultation with 
the team of accountant - 
usually termed Assurance 
or Treasury. To be signed 
off. 
Internal documents are the 
focus at this stage - i.e. the 
business plan alongside the 
strategy documents for the 
parent company. 
4. Business plan 
(containing the 
results of the 
capital budgeting) 
is sent to the board. 
Stage 4 Business Plan presented to 
the Board. 
Internal documents are the 
focus at this stage - i.e. the 
business plan alongside the 
strategy documents for the 
parent company. 
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   Process 2,3,4 are repeated 
until the final decision is 
made. This took several 
years. 
 
5. Continuing the 
lobbying process 
for future change 
Stage 5 The generators continued 
to lobby Whitehall for 
changes to energy policy 
and market structure to 
encourage new investment. 
Data from the modelling is 
used in a negotiating space 
- alongside government 
consultation documents. 
 
The first step when a new environmental directive is introduced is for DEFRA, the Environment 
Agency and the generators, to work through the directive together to understand how to formulate a 
general policy with targets.  Part of each of their contextual analyses is to create a workable 
framework that would enable the generators to make decisions about whether to opt in or opt out of 
the directive. 
Capital budgeting modelling began during the process of negotiation between the EA, JEP, 
individual generators, and lobbyists. When the government privatised the industry, they declared that 
investment would become market led, “Firms were persuaded to use DCF techniques for investment 
decisions by virtue of their objectivity and superiority to conventional techniques. Economic growth 
would thereby be simulated, the performance of individual firms improved, and the need for direct 
intervention by government avoided” (Miller, 1991: 736). However, this assertion failed to consider 
the influence of politicians’ actions on investments. When the language of capital budgeting prevails, 
the modelling of all investments, including the LCPD, exposes the significance of future political 
policies and current frameworks. It demonstrates that to be able to create a model, additional 
decisions needed to be made to support any predictions.This was an important step when the 
generators were engaged in conduct analysis. 
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Although the government had taken a laissez faire approach, most environmental regulations require 
the generators to select Best Available Techniques (BAT)18. However, the government at this stage, 
either could not, or would not, provide sufficient detail. This became a problem when modelling 
alternative investments. As a Team Coordinator of the EA stated, ‘The government is so feeble in 
terms of laying down a national strategy’.  
The generators found it difficult to plan their approach to decisions when there was little guidance 
on future policies. It was accepted practice that each project must gain required rate of return and 
that all actors should recognise this. The need for companies to provide required returns resulted in 
this respect was a substantial component of their business plans and subsequent discussions.  
This stage of the process took considerable time and in fact, some of the finer details were still being 
debated in 2008, the year when decisions had to be made. This first stage involving working with the 
regulators was important, because the right discussions and lobbying could mean the difference 
between a successful project and an unsuccessful one. The generators wanted all the details presented 
in a financial format, so that they could understand the impact of the changes they were facing. The 
regulators were also open to criticism because they did not have all the answers. The generators 
realised they could use financial arguments strategically to embed knowledge of ultimate 
consequences into the discussions. They used this to present suggestions of what would work to 
transform the directive from words on a piece of paper to something operational. In other words,  
they were able to plan their conduct around the financial data they were modelling. 
This point was affirmed by one of the generators who said: 
The LCPD is a piece of legislation written by European Bureaucrats in closed rooms… the 
definitions were not clear. The commission went overboard in terms of detail and as a result it 
did not work. One of the things we lobbied for to overcome many of these problems was 
                                                          
18“ ‘Best available techniques’ (BAT) means the available techniques which are the best for preventing or 
minimising emissions and impacts on the environment.” https://www.gov.uk/guidance/best-available-
techniques-environmen 
tal-permits 
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plantwide management and we got that. For other generators the decision were far more 
complex. 
 
The withholding of investment by the generators became an act of strategic conduct, one of resistance 
or salvo in a dialectic of control. In the case of the LCPD, the process involved negotiating space 
prior to making decisions. In process 2 (see Table 2) the modelling process begins to develop 
scenarios that can be used whether to whether opt in or opt out of the directive.  
Completing the full cycle of the business development planning can also be seen as conduct analysis  
When the modelling is complete the business plan is then checked alongside the model prepared by 
the accountants. They are usually positioned in the ‘Assurance Group’ (also known as the ‘Treasury 
Group’), referred to as stage 3 in Table 2. As one Head of Coal Operations stated, 
They don’t crawl over the model but they have to satisfy themselves that it is an accurate 
reflection… not from a technical perspective, from a purely economic perspective. 
However,both the General Manager of Operations and the Commercial Manager argued that one of 
the most important checks for all the modelling requirements is carried out on underlying 
transactions, because under IFS 3919 if items are reported incorrectly that can create problems. One 
Commercial Manager argued: 
One party might look at a capital investment because it looked like the right thing to do, but 
now because of the financial reporting, although the underlying transaction is the same, the 
way it is reported it might not be perceived as being a good transaction. 
 Once the Treasury has signed off the Business Plan, process 4 begins, and the Business Plan is 
submitted to the Board of Directors. The Board does not see the modelling itself, but the Business 
Plan contains the rationale and the outcomes of the modelling. In the companies that were 
interviewed, all parties confirmed that it is the Chief Executive who makes the final decision. With 
                                                          
19 Relevant at the time of the interviews. 
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the investments considered in this case study, Processes 2-4 happened several times because the 
uncertainty within the modelling was so high it was, in many cases, difficult to formulate decisions: 
Earlier on a lot of it is educated guess work, we have to keep refining the model until we 
get a clearer view. (Head of Coal Operations) 
 There was a clear process, almost a ritual, that had to be followed to justify the decision making 
process and the ultimate decision.In addition, it helped them to plan future lobbying. The generators 
had to draw on their knowledge of their own company, the actions of their competitors and future 
moves from the regulators and government. Withholding investing would have a strong impact in 
the UK but it would not stop the parent companies growing because each of the large players were 
international companies who could use their capital anywhere in the world. 
The modelling demonstrated the financial consequences of adhering to, or not adhering to, the 
regulations established by the EA. The regulators were aware that the generators could make things 
difficult for them, and that they would have to share some pain along the way. One regulator said: 
We shared a bit of the pain with them, you can’t shut a plant down if that means it will block 
the actual grid because you will cause more pollution doing that. 
Through the process of working collaboratively, the regulators and generators increased 
knowledgeability on both sides. The regulators understood how the definitions would impact the 
generators financially, but they also became aware of what might occur to the supply of the electricity 
if they did not work together. Additionally, the generators were able to work more efficiently to carry 
out modelling when working with the regulator, because they grew to understand how and in what 
ways the market would analyse emissions in the future.  
 
6.3 Actions taken using capital budgeting 
The actions taken on the basis of knowledge derived from capital budgeting came in three stages. 
The first stage involved the  the generators deciding whether or not to opt in or out of the directive. 
If they opted out they would be requesting a limited life derogation as a result of the 20,000 hour 
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generation scheme (steps 2-4 in Table 2) The generators used the capital budgeting modelling to 
present scenarios: 
We have to model the different scenarios……. we had fifteen options running with this one. 
It is more complicated than it looks because we have to work with potential suppliers to see 
if the options are economically viable so we have to invest to speculate…..gone are the days 
where we just put a tender out. We were looking for an 8 or 9 percent return. (Head of Coal 
Operations) 
Each generator had to undertake the process of creating the business plans using the outcomes of 
the modelling. The boards would make a decision based on their strategic intentions and the 
economic viability of each power station. The scenarios included incoming cashflow from opting 
for the derogation and shutting the plants down. 
In the second stage those who decide to comply with the directive had to decide  how they wanted 
governed.  During their context analysis of these investments and the strategic conduct planning for 
the lobbying of better technical guidance of how the directive could work, the generators had 
managed to convince the politicians that two approaches were acceptable. The Head of Environment 
gave this evidence: 
We had Ministers turning up wanting to know why we wanted the National Plan rather 
than the ELV, it was quite an intensive debate…...we got both. 
The two governance approaches were the Emissions Limit Value20 (ELV) and the National Emissions 
Reduction Plan21 (NERP).  Modelling allowed each generator to calculate the economic effects of 
having emissions measured and managed in different ways.  However, this was, once again, not as 
                                                          
20 This was where a   power station must meet specific limits based on the  amounts of 
pollutants produced on a “milligramme per cubic metre of waste gas“ basis. Correct at the 
time the decisions were taken. 
21 A generating company would be  given allowance, known as a bubble.  The bubble would 
be the amount of a pollutant that can be emitted in any given year. The bubble issued under 
NERP would be  tradable within a member state. Correct at the time the decisions were 
taken. 
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straightforward as it seems because they knew there was uncertainty about how these rules may have 
been changing in 2015. Some generators who chose to make decision before the full information was 
present to take action did make mistakes. This explanation was given by one of the Environmental 
Planning Managers: 
The definitions and governance changes made a huge problem for one generator who did 
not hold out for the lobbying to end; they had decided to fit FGD to half of of the plant but 
they only had one stack so they were left hanging…... 
The lobbying process had proved invaluable in improving the accuracy of the modelling process. 
The third action was based on how each generator would lobby for change to the market framework. 
They needed to persuade the government to provide clearer policy. This was both for the generators 
who opted out and those who opted in, because now the UK needed new investment to replace the 
Power Stations that would be closing. The investment hiatus started at this point. 
Miller (1991:735) stated: “[f]or differing periods, and with differing effects, accounting technologies 
have been identified as integral to, and enabling of, particular strategies of macro-economic 
government”. The use of regulations to achieve control provides contradictions within the system, 
which served the dialectic of control set up by the generators.  
Giddens (1979:148) stated, “The more tightly-knit and inflexible the formal relations of authority 
within an organisation, in fact, the more the possible openings for circumventing them”. The 
withholding of investment forced the government to engage in a consultation to effect reform, which 
led to the Electricity Market Reform (EMR). Here, capital budgeting did facilitate change in societal 
structures. The ability of generators to use capital budgeting exposed the weakness of laissez faire 
approaches to energy policies.  This also affected the general economic health of the country, because 
these financial incentives come from taxpayers.  
Due to the introduction of the revised LCPD, generators were able to take a firm stand regarding 
investment. A significant number of power companies chose to opt out of the regulation, because the 
modelling, the lack of secure incentives and uncertain policies resulted in risk deemed incompatible 
with required returns. Once the LCPD reform process concluded, it was apparent that the generators 
were not going to make investments for the sake of it:  
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We have to fight for capital, we put the business plans forward but so do Mexico, 
America and Spain. (Head of Coal Operations) 
However, the biggest problem was not the planned shutdown of the large coal and oil plants. In fact, 
this was a direction that the UK government favoured; i.e. a smaller portfolio of assets reliant on 
fossil fuel. The more urgent problem was stated by the Government in 2007 as: 
Energy companies are also going to be making large investments in the coming years to 
update and replace aging power stations and infrastructure. We need to create the right 
conditions for this investment, so we get timely and increasingly low carbon supplies. 
(DTI, Meeting the energy challenge, White paper, May 2007) 
Although in 2007 and 2008 the government remained strong in its emphasis on market led 
investment, the generators were lobbying for change in incentives for new investments. One 
explanation from the generators was 
I don’t think they will relax the rules (on emissions22) but I think they will pay some kind 
of capacity payment just in case they need a backup. (Head of Coal Operations) 
The problem arose when alternative investments failed to materialise. Some companies proposed 
new gas power stations, but did not  build them. A Head of Corporate Regulation told us that: 
The most significant thing we need is a clear energy policy by the government. A coherent 
policy, so for example the government targets of renewables are quite frankly not worth 
the paper they are written on because we do not believe they are achievable... a horrifying 
bodge you would expect from the Politicians23. For 20 years the industry have spotted that 
we are reaching the end of the lives of many assets but the government won’t commit on 
coal power, nuclear etc., it is all sky dreams of renewables. First you need policy form 
government, then planning then the serious money will come from the big players. 
An Environmental Planning Manager added a typical comment from the big six in 2008: 
                                                          
22 added for explanation 
23 This was based on the position in 2009. 
30 
 
No one has to keep the lights on anymore, no one at all. I guess under the Electricity 
Act, suppliers have a duty to supply to residential users… I think that’s actually 
required, but nothing in the Act says how they’re going to get the stuff they’re going to 
supply. The argument is the market will meet it. So, if we stop generating, the theory is 
people will panic and give us what we want.  
The lack of investment resulted in a shift of power between the government, the regulators and the 
generators. This became apparent by 2011, when the regulators and government finally accepted 
market led investments were not working. The lobbying from the generators to Whitehall was 
beginning to have an impact. The generators used their modelling to explain why they were not 
investing, and chose to make a deliberate choice to strategically use accounting to demonstrate their 
arguments. Subordinates started to take strategic action to instigate change by withholding 
investment, an action designed to create a level of what Giddens (1984) would call dialectic of 
control. The generators used the knowledge they had gained in stage 1, to instigate market changes. 
Through lobbying and the modelling of future problems and supply issues, the government 
acknowledged that change was indeed required, as demonstrated by DECC, another industry 
regulator: 
Security of supply is threatened as existing plants close. Over the next decade we will 
close a quarter (around 20GW) of existing generation capacity as old or more polluting 
plants close. Modelling suggests that the de-rated capacity margins could fall below five 
percent around the end of this decade, increasing the likelihood of blackouts. (DECC, 
2011:5). 
The White Paper continued: 
There is broad consensus that current market arrangements will not deliver the scale of 
long-term investments needed, at the required pace, to meet the challenges… the 
challenges of decarbonisation and security of supply. Nor will they give the customers the 
best deal. (DECC, 2011:6) 
The environmental investments the government had favoured back in 2006 (see earlier) but which 
did not materialise, were controlled according to regulatory framework designed to provide some 
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controls over emissions. These controls were imposed in a relational sense, because although the 
government created regulations enabling regulators to control the industry, control only resulted if 
the generators adhered to them which they did.  In many cases this led to a decision not to invest in 
the UK, because capital budgeting modelling showed it was demonstrably more financially effective 
to invest in other countries. Whilst the the government can pass regulation, control of the ability to 
generate or to not generate electricity rests with the generators.  
6.4 Outcomes of actions taken based on knowledge  
The generators knew the government could not continue to hold off any intervention indefinitely, 
because security of supply would become an issue. As many interviewees stated, the government 
could not let the lights go out. Adding pressure to the UK government, the generators also had access 
to and knowledge of  overlapping social systems in those countries that provided more clarity in their 
regulations. The generators knew that a lack of investment would lead to a change in the market 
structure, because blackouts result in industry backlash and a loss of votes in national elections. 
However, the generators had the option to simply invest capital in a country where more certainty 
exists. The primary concern of international generators is how best to satisfy their shareholders24, not 
governments.  
Therefore, the uncertainty created by the government hindered the generators’ strategic direction and 
willingness to pursue development within the UK. The generators played on the potential power they 
could mobilise, which resulted from the resources they owned (capital, technology and knowledge) 
and their ability to control production, to eventually force a crisis. The White Paper (2011) took steps 
to start addressing the concerns the generators had raised at the beginning of this project, in 2006. 
The modelling process within the investment appraisal process highlighted security of supply issues 
(part of the energy trilemma) within the industry, and the generators used this knowledge, providing 
                                                          
24 As highlighted  by one of our reviewer  most investors will have other investments, not to mention other 
roles in British society, and from these positions then lower generating capacity and the consequences of 
power failures and blackouts would be as bad for them as it is for everyone else, and so to support a policy of 
not investing isn't in their interests either. However, the parent company of the UK generators will consider 
the risks involved in long term investments. If they can secure better returns through an invetsment hiatus 
they will or they will divest their assets in that country and move location. 
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a strong negotiating position. The accounting, i.e. the process of modelling, demonstrated the 
consequences of not changing the market.  
By taking courageous decisions to shut down plants early, those generators who opted out helped the 
industry focus on the emerging security of supply issue. The generators’ decision to opt out reasoned 
that the financial implications of continuing would alienate their shareholders, and the accounting 
models provided the evidence they required to explain this to the regulators. Many of the generators 
stated they had nothing to lose. The strategic decision to run 20,000 hours hard and fast was taken 
by most generators to reduce fixed costs. The generators were also hoping that if they ran the hours 
fast, forcing a crisis, the government would rethink their target dates, which would be of benefit to 
the generators. These benefits would include movement to a more secure future energy policy, and 
possibly an extended allocation of hours, to provide security of supply.  
 
7 Discussion 
It was exceptionally naive to believe market led investment would work without implementing a 
focused energy policy. The generators used this naivety to push for returns on the capacity payment 
scheme25 to assure future investments could be made in a climate of greater certainty. In this case 
study, we provide evidence to demonstrate structural change was attributable to the strategic conduct 
of generators both at the stage of negotiating an operational framework for the revised directive and 
when the generators withheld investment on basis of accounting information. The accounting 
information generated knowledge on which the generators could act, but also changed the 
knowledgeability of the regulators/government. 
Table 3 - Structural changes created through the use of accounting information. 
                                                          
25 The capacity payments are that part of the EMR first introduced in 2014, as mentioned in a previous footnote. The 
market had a capacity payment system, following privatisation; however, it was removed when the market structures 
changes and electricity was sold as any other commodity in 2001. 
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Insert: Table 3 - Structural changes created through the use of accounting information. 
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With the generators refusing to invest, the government could not be seen to be letting the lights go 
out, nor could they be seen to be bailing out an industry which on paper looked profitable. The review, 
which commenced in Autumn 2010 was inevitable. The EMR is the result of that review, and in 
2014-15 the first phase of a new market structure was completed. Throughout this study the 
generators, despite being under the authority of the regulators and government, were able to mobilise 
power by drawing on their knowledge, while working within the constraints of the current structures. 
The generators maximised the impact of their own resources, the lack of government resources, and 
the missing frame of reference, to highlight their needs, motivated by a desire for improved certainty. 
Accounting models provided the foundations for lobbying for changes, although as one member of 
the regulatory team (working for one of the generators) said:  
NPV is the traditional method we use when looking at any investments and also when 
deciding how to lobby for change, we use this with the regulators through our published 
responses and with Treasury when we are acting as king of consultants to demonstrate 
things to them.  
Capital budgeting plays a significant role in articulating how accounting can instigate change in 
wider social practices. Demonstrating this is one contribution of this research. Generators within the 
electricity generation industry drew strategically on their knowledge of the regulatory environment, 
their business and their resources, to demand reconstruction and revision of the market structure 
relative to investment. The use of capital budgeting techniques allowed generators to exploit the 
notion of a ‘double contingency of interaction’. This indicates that the reaction of each party or actor 
to an interaction that takes place, is dependent upon the responses of others. Each party or actor, in 
effect, has reciprocal opportunities to sanction the actions of others. The government cannot use the 
process of regulation to create sustainable generation if the generators are able to create a negotiation 
space to drive change using contradictions within the trilemma. Therefore, capital budgeting 
modelling has forced the government to interact once again with the industry (Miller, 1991). The 
capital budgeting process provided an opportunity to expose the contradictory nature of the 
regulations in place and shifted the power balance in favour of the generators, adding further pressure 
to the trilemma. The generators are able to control the process of generation, and utilise the ‘norms’ 
of shareholders’ demands for investment to provide economically sound returns.  
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The political negotiations involved in devising new policy have previously created barriers to 
investment, as shown here. The lack of government direction seems to have been the source of the 
problem, and the capital budgeting modelling exposed it. Current uncertainty has provided greater 
leverage to the strategy of investment appraisal, and has become more than simply a passive 
technique. 
In summary, the generators undertook a two stage lobbying process. First, changes to the 
implementations of the directive itself, these included changes to the definitions and the ways in 
which emissions would be monitored. Although not all the generators received exactly what they 
wanted, there were enough substantive changes made to the directive to demonstrate the power of 
the generators’ strategic conduct. The EA agreed changes were required once they understood the 
engineering capabilities of the various plants. Ultimately, both the EA and the generators agreed the 
original directive included targets and processes that were either simply not possible or very unlikely. 
Both increased their knowledgeability through the use of the language of capital appraisal to 
demonstrate the economic consequences of the environmental directive. 
Second, the generators were clearly hoping for a capacity payment to encourage new investment. 
Such capacity payments were introduced through the EMR. However, the way in which it has been 
implemented has resulted in no new significant investment by the large six generators. Consequently, 
there are now movements among some to divest this side of the business. Therefore, the 
consequences of the lobbying for change here has resulted in unintended consequences for the 
generators. The story of what has happened since the EMR is complex and requires a new approach 
to understand the consequences of implementing a novel market process. Using the methodological 
brackets of agents’ conduct and context analysis, interviewing and documentary analysis focuses 
attention on eliciting knowledge and understanding agents in terms of the analysis that they apply 
towards their own situations and the situations of those they are trying to influence. Through this 
analysis, researchers might then identify the specific choices made to alter the actions of others, and 
thus alter the structural elements of systems. 
This review of how senior managers in the electricity generation companies acted to address the 
energy trilemma, offers an example of a clear application of strategic conduct analysis. They drew 
reflexively on their knowledge of the contradictory positions of the EU regulators (reducing 
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emission) and the GB government (in terms of keeping prices low for consumers and maintaining 
security of supply); of the resources available to them as providers of capital; of the environmental 
impact of different methods of electricity generation; and of the presentation of evidence in the form 
of capital budgets. In addition to their knowledge of context, they understood the extent to which 
they could resist those in authority and what the conduct of the regulators and the government might 
be, in order to shape the framework for the implementation of the LCPD through a capacity payment 
system. They were able to enact what Giddens’ (1984) termed a dialectic of control, and what Stones 
(2005) reframes as  concepts of reflexivity and resistance. In doing so, the perspective and 
knowledgeability of the regulators, government and to some extent, the public, was altered. This, in 
turn, led to reallocation of resources; amendments to rules and routines, and reconsideration of what 
constituted normative behaviours.  
Expressed differently, structural change was a result of strategic conduct, including a deliberate 
choice in the use and presentation of capital budgeting by generators. Theoretically, this allows us to 
extend our understanding of ST in an accounting context by viewing accounting as not simply 
embodied in rules, routines, resources and norms, but as a strategic choice in communication. We 
can perceive how agents conduct themselves by using accounting in persuasive discussions and 
arguments, both oral and written. When other agents accept or adopt such communications, and these 
become part of their own knowledge and arguments, then structures change to accommodate new 
knowledge, either as the original agents intended or otherwise.  
8. Conclusions 
This case study has demonstrated how the strategic conduct of the generators included using 
accounting to produce change in the structure, knowledgeability and processes of the market. The 
case also shows that the concept of a dialectic of control allowed generators within the electricity 
generation industry to demand reconstruction and revision of the market structure relative to 
investment. The paper also demonstrates how the government and regulators, were forced to take the 
concerns of the generators seriously due to an investment hiatus. The generators rather than 
mobilising their resources, held their capital back. The need for resources to tackle emissions 
provided the industry with sufficient evidence to force the government to consider the problem of 
energy as not just one of price to consumers, but of long term supply and environmental 
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sustainability, demanding further investment. The knowledgeability of the generators also played an 
essential role in effecting change in the rules and structures of the markets within which they operate 
- rules and resources that impact investment directly. However, recent changes in the energy markets 
arising from the falling prices of oil, and pressure for renewable resources, means the value and use 
of capital budgeting by managers and the government should be kept under observation by 
researchers, in order that the structuration processes in accounting practice can be understood more 
fully, in particular in industrial contexts. 
As well as contributing to knowledge of how strategic investment decision making happens within 
energy markets, an under-researched area, we also make a theoretical contribution to structuration 
theory as it is used in accounting research. Stones’ (2005) development of the epistemology of ST is 
strengthened through the empirical evidence presented in this study, as show how persuasive 
arguments, using the language and logic of accounting, can change structures. Further theoretical 
development is necessary but the contribution made here is a greater understanding of how 
accounting can be used (or misused or abused, as Jack (2017) posits) in attempts to change 
organisational and societal systems. Based on the evidence from this case, we suggest that researchers 
pay more attention to the precise nature and choice of accounting communications made by those 
agents with a strategic interest in making or preventing change. 
  
38 
 
Appendix - Interview questions 
The questions are representative of the questions in the main data collections period; however, 
it should be noted that the exploratory interviews and follow up interviews focused on different 
areas. Later interviews focused on the outcomes. 
 
1.Name  
2. Job title  
3.Have you worked in this industry or been associated with this industry within any other 
roles than your current position?  
4.Company  
5.How long have you worked in or been associated with the industry  
The following two questions are very much open ended and I am interested in your thoughts 
and knowledge:  
6.In terms of how the industry has changed,  what would you say have been the biggest 
changes?  
7.How would you describe the current position of the UK electricity industry – what are the 
main issues and who do they involve?  
Now I have some specific questions which as I explained early may repeat some of the issues 
you have just discussed but they have evolved from the research framework that I am using 
for this project.  
8.Are you / were you involved in the LCPD as part of your role? If so, how?  
9.How did you get to understand the requirements and implications of the LCPD? For example 
did you have training, informal conversations with other people in the industry etc....  
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10.How were / how do you think the decisions to opt in or out of the LCPD were made?  How 
did you plan for these changes? The regulator provides a guide on how to determine the 
decision but do you think this was used as part of the process or simply to submit the decision 
made by other internal processes?  
11. In an ideal world how do you think investments decisions should be made, on what basis? 
For example in the 1960s investment decisions were made based upon predicted growth of 
electricity needs  
12. In the real world what do you think drives investment decisions in this sector?  
13. Who would you say are the main people involved in the LCPD process?  
14. How influential is accounting in the communication process of the LCPD process? On the 
PPC document, although there is a small section for cost/ benefit it is only one small section 
of this document.  
15. Over  your career in this industry / being associated with this industry how has the use of 
accounting changed?  
16. The industry has many different professionals involved for example engineers, 
accountants and regulators.  Have you seen any changes in the influence of these roles within 
the industry.  
17. How can professionals in this industry influence decisions, for example, the regulators can 
use the law if organisations are not complying with the various regulations.  
18. The energy sector at the moment is currently having to comply with environmental 
directives set by the EU and other sources, ensure there is security of supply and generate 
profit – if you had to put these in order of importance how would you rank them with the first 
being the most important.  
40 
 
19. Based on your previous answer, over the course of your career in this sector have you 
witnessed any changes in this ranking?  
20. When making investment decision in the UK electricity industry what information is 
gathered to make these decisions / do you think is drawn upon?  
21. Now we have discussed my questions have you got any other information which you 
would like to add?  
Additional questions if relevant to the person being interviewed:  
22. What was the cost of FDG?  
23. Do you think the regulators anticipated as many opt outs?   
24. Information from regulators – was everything clear? How did you lobby the regulators if 
you required more information?  
25. Did the regulators change any of their policies, standpoints due to the lobbying from other 
parties?  
26. Do you see the industry changing in the future in relation to regulation – more, less or 
stay the same.  
27. How closely did the environment teams and the Environment Agency work together of 
the problems of the LCPD?  
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